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Challenging the rise of
nationalist-religious parties in India
and Turkey
NITISH DUTT & EDDIE J. GIRDNER
ABSTRACT Examinations of how the secular state deals with the threat posed by ‘nationalist-
religious’ parties (as distinct from ‘religious-nationalist ’ parties) has received little attention.
Consequently, this paper focuses on the available strategies for dealing with relatively
moderate nationalist-religious parties like the Refah Party in Turkey and the Bharatiya
Janata Party in India. In particular, it examines two opposed approaches: that which seeks
to exclude and isolate such parties, as in the case of Turkey; and that which adopts a policy
of engagement, as in India. The paper then assesses the relative merits of these two strategies
and concludes that the latter approach provides a more effective means of dealing with
nationalist-religious parties, especially in democratic countries.
Of growing concern in recent times is the increasing prominence of religious
‘fundamentalist ’ parties in the political arena in countries like India, Turkey,
Egypt and Algeria.1 The electoral success of religious parties like the Bharatiya
Jananta Party (BJP) in India and the Refah Party (RP) in Turkey, and their
emergence as contenders for political power, are widely perceived to pose a
threat to the secular state in the two countries.2 Although there is a growing
literature focusing on the nature and sources of what is referred to as ‘religious
fundamentalist ’ political groupings, much less attention has been devoted to the
strategies or means of dealing with the threat. This paper seeks to  ll this gap
in the literature by focusing on the cases of two dissimilar but secular democratic
countries—India and Turkey—which face similar challenges to the secular state
from nationalist-religiou s parties. Drawing their sustenance from Hinduism and
Islam, the BJP in India and the RP in Turkey have succeeded, unlike more
radical religious movements, in making their presence felt in the electoral arena
through the ballot box. Signi cantly, the methods adopted by the state in the two
countries to deal with the threat are diametrically opposite, and illustrate the
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NITISH DUTT & EDDIE J. GIRDNER
problems and possibilitie s suggested by a policy of exclusion in Turkey and
inclusion in India.
The choice of these two countries was dictated by the use of a ‘most similar’
systems design3 which involves holding constant all those variables that do not
constitute the central concern of the study, thereby permitting the observation of
variation in the dependent variable of interest to the analyst. In the context of
this paper, the use of this design means selecting two parties which resemble
each other as closely as possible with regard to contextual factors but differ
signi cantly in terms of the phenomenon of interest. The cases of the Hindu-
nationalist BJP in India and the Islamist-nationalis t RP in Turkey largely satisfy
the requirements of the most-similar systems design in that the politics of
religious resurgence in India and Turkey, especially in the electoral arena,
paralled each other in many respects. At the same time, the state and most
secular parties in India and Turkey have adopted a policy of inclusion and
exclusion, respectively, to combat the perceived threat of religious nationalism
to their secular systems.
From a cultural, social, economic and political perspective, Turkey and India
are different in many respects with regard to their history, culture, political
institutions , and religious persuasion among others. But they also share certain
similarities which are central to the concerns of this paper. First, both Turkey
and India are democracies and committed to the idea of a secular state which is
enshrined in their respective constitutions . Second, both countries are confronted
by nationalist-religiou s parties which managed to gain power through democratic
means, thereby increasing the problem of dealing with them. Third, in recent
years, the formation and disintegration of coalition governments in fairly rapid
succession has been a characteristic feature of politics in the two countries.
Fourth, the general ideological orientation, organization and strategy for gaining
power by the RP and the BJP are quite similar in many respects.
These two parties, however, represent two different religious persuasions and
this helps to increase the ‘generalizability ’ of the  ndings to other countries.
Based on a comparative analysis of the responses of two somewhat different
political systems to the same type of threat, we draw some general inferences
regarding the most advantageous means of dealing with nationalist-religiou s
parties within a democratic framework. Finally, we examine the ability of such
parties to govern, as well as the impact of wielding power on the political appeal
of such parties. Before addressing these issues we brie y outline a number of
similarities between the two parties regarding their electoral fortunes, ideology,
organization and strategy for gaining power.
Similarities between the BJP and RP
The results of the May 1966 elections in India and the December 1995 election
in Turkey marked a major watershed in the electoral history of the two countries.
As a direct result of the elections, the two countries witnessed a seismic shift in
































NATIONALIST-RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY
defeat. Thus, for the  rst time in the history of the two countries, nationalist -
religious parties emerged as winners in the electoral arena. Starting in the early
1990s, both the BJP and the RP became major contenders for political power
with the BJP increasing its share of the vote eightfold between 1952 and 1999,
while the RP managed to double its share between 1973 and 1995, followed by
a drop in 1999 (see Figure 1). Their rapidly rising popularity meant that in a
relatively short time, both moved from the fringes of the political spectrum to
become the largest parties in their respective legislatures.
Part of the success of the two parties can be attributed to their efforts to
provide those uprooted from their traditional environment with a bridging
ideology; one, which while offering an intensely needed emotional tie with the
past, also claimed to provide a philosophica l and practical framework for coping
with, and regulating change.4 The RP and the BJP, like religious revivalist
movements elsewhere, are ambivalent in their principles re ecting contradictory
tendencies and factions. Both parties adopt a moralistic tone and are adept at
using some of the buzzwords of liberal politics like ‘civil society’, ‘pluralism’
and ‘social consensus’ even while denouncing and distancing themselves from
the established ‘system’. Both parties speak of a ‘brotherhood’ and a ‘new social
order’ and advocate economic and ethnic nationalism, anti-communism and
anti-westernism.5 However, after gaining power, both considerably toned down
their anti-western rhetoric and in its post-1998 incarnation, the BJP with its
new-found pragmatism seems to have opened out to the West. Both parties
thrive on political opportunism and, like other parties, are prepared to compro-
mise their principles in order to gain power. This fact is clearly demonstrated by
the RP’s 1996 efforts to form a coalition government, and the BJP’s pre-1999
electoral urgency to form alliances with other regional parties regardless of the
fact that none of them even remotely identi ed with its brand of religious
nationalism.
The BJP and the RP are also similar in terms of their support base. Both
parties appeal to those who feel uncomfortable with the secular elites in their
countries, whom they consider to be arti cial and alien. Not surprisingly , their
traditional clientele consist of small businessmen, shopkeepers, small merchants,
artisans and the more prosperous segments of the rural population. In India, the
higher castes  gure prominently in the BJP’s support base.6 Over the years, both
parties expanded their basis of support among the young and the urban
population. By the 1990s, however, differences appeared in the support base of
the two parties (see Tables 1 and 2). The RP, for example, tended to have greater
appeal for women, while support for the Hindu-nationalis t BJP differed little
between men and women. Also, while the BJP received more support from the
middle classes, the RP attracted larger numbers of the lower working class of
unskilled workers who  ll the shanty towns of the largest cities, particularly
Istanbul and Ankara.
The pre and post-election maneuverings in the two countries also suggest
some interesting parallels. In both countries, there was a lack of unity among
































































































Source: J.C. Agarwal and N.K. Chaudhury, Elections in India 1998 (with 
comparative data since 1952), (New Delhi: Sipra Publications, 1998); 
Nermin Abadad-Unat, ’Legitimacy, Participation and Restricted 
Pluralism: the 1987 Elections in Turkey,’ Ankara University Political 
Science Faculty Bulletin 44:1–2 (January–June 1988), pp. 17-38; and 
various issues of the Turkish Daily News, 1990–1996.
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Figure 1. Electoral support at the national level for the NS/RP/FP and the BJS/BJP.
1995 to form a coalition government failed, faced with outright opposition from
the secular parties. Ultimately, by forming coalitions with other parties, both
succeeded in coming to power at the head of coalition governments. In each
case, the two parties bene ted both from disgruntled voters and a lack of unity
among secular parties. In Turkey, the RP managed to form a government in
alliance with the secular True Path Party (DYP). In India, the BJP, learning from
its 1996 failure to gain power, changed tack. The BJP, at the cost of its ‘holier
than thou’ posture, defeated the secular parties at their own game by forming a
series of opportunisti c electoral alliances with smaller regional parties. Together
with these allies, the BJP emerged as the single largest vote-getter in the country.
Helped by rifts between and within the secular parties, the BJP-led coalition was
able to win the vote of con dence in Parliament and install, for the  rst time in
India’s history, an avowedly religious party at the helm of the national govern-
ment.7
The crucial difference for purposes of comparative analyses, however, centers
































NATIONALIST-RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY
Table 1. Party support in Turkey by demographic and socio-economic status 1990 (%)
RP 1 DYP 1 Non-
Allies ANAP DMP DSP SHP voters Other
Gender
Male 4.8 31.2 14.8 8.5 21.4 10.5 8.9
Female 7.7 15.9 17.4 17.6 20.0 12.9 8.4
N 5 (58) (217) (149) (121) (191) (108) (80)
v 2 5 49.6, p , 0.001
Age
18–24 9.0 23.8 14.8 8.5 21.2 12.7 10.1
25–34 7.1 19.5 15.0 14.6 20.2 13.9 9.7
35–44 3.3 27.0 15.6 16.6 19.9 10.4 7.1
45–54 6.8 24.1 18.8 14.3 21.8 9.0 5.3
55–64 2.5 22.2 22.2 9.9 22.2 8.6 12.4
65 1 11.4 22.9 14.3 8.6 20.0 14.3 8.6
N 5 (58) (212) (149) (120) (190) (107) (80)
v 2 5 51.0, p , 0.01
Subjective Class
Upper (3) 17.5 11.9 14.3 27.8 19.8 6.3
Middle 6.2 25.4 15.3 10.4 19.9 15.3 7.5
Skilled 5.6 24.2 20.0 15.3 17.2 7.9 9.8
Unskilled 8.2 23.9 16.0 12.3 22.2 6.2 11.1
N 5 (54) (210) (144) (113) (187) (104) (79)
v 2 5 61.2, p , 0.001
Income
Low 4.3 23.8 17.5 12.2 23.8 8.3 10.2
Medium 7.5 22.4 15.5 13.8 19.3 13.5 8.0
High (1) 42.9 (3) 9.5 19.0 (3) —
N 5 (58) (212) (131) (119) (189) (107) (78)
v 2 5 31.9, p , 0.05
Education
None 5.7 36.2 19.8 9.0 17.5 5.1 6.8
Primary 6.1 23.7 17.4 15.9 18.4 9.0 9.4
Junior High 6.3 18.9 11.6 13.7 23.2 15.8 10.5
Vocational 13.3 8.9 13.3 11.1 17.8 26.7 (4)
College/
University (3) 14.9 9.5 10.8 33.8 23.0 (3)
N 5 (54) (210) (142) (118) (174) (96) (74)
v 2 5 122.6, p , 0.001
Source: World Values Study Group, World Values Survey 1990 (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social
Research).
seen in India. In Turkey, the military presented a list of demands that the RP
could not meet. Consequently, a case was initiated charging the party with
violating the secular requirements of the constitution. The RP was declared
illegal and its leader Necmettin Erbakan, was banned from politics for  ve
years.8 In India, the BJP has enjoyed greater freedom to operate within the
Indian political space, though at the state level it suffered some reverses in the
form of having its government dismissed from of ce in Utter Pradesh. But, even
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Table 2. Party Support in India by Demographic and Socio-Economic Status 1990 (%)
Cong CPI (M) Cong Inde-
(I) BJP JD CPI R pendent Other
Gender
Male 16.7 27.8 26.9 10.1 5.4 2.0 11.2
Female 7.7 15.9 17.4 17.6 3.9 20.0 12.9
N 5 (310) (469) (418) (195) (77) (175) (168)
v 2 5 10.4, ns
Age
18–24 16.0 30.7 25.4 14.0 4.3 2.5 7.1
25–34 21.9 30.2 22.9 10.2 4.6 1.5 8.8
35–44 16.5 26.1 28.0 11.2 3.3 1.9 12.9
45–54 21.2 26.5 23.8 13.2 4.0 2.6 8.6
55–64 17.6 21.6 24.2 9.2 5.9 2.0 19.6
65 1 16.7 19.4 19.4 8.3 19.4 2.8 13.9
N 5 (309) (468) (418) (194) (77) (34) (175)
v 2 5 62.0, p , 0.001
Subjective Class
Upper 18.8 25.9 30.6 9.4 3.9 — 11.4
Middle 18.8 30.2 23.7 10.3 4.3 2.2 10.4
Skilled 16.7 23.9 24.6 14.4 7.5 (2) 12.1
Unskilled 19.5 25.4 23.7 17.2 1.8 6.5 5.9
N 5 (310) (469) (418) (195) (77) (34) (175)
v 2 5 56.3, p , 0.001
Income
Low 17.3 29.3 24.3 11.6 5.6 2.6 9.2
Medium 17.7 26.1 27.0 11.0 2.8 1.6 13.1
High (1) 28.0 23.1 12.3 6.2 (1) (3)
N 5 (300) (456) (413) (186) (75) (33) (174)
v 2 5 35.0, p , 0.01
Education
None 16.4 25.3 21.2 6.2 5.5 2.1 23.3
Primary 18.0 22.8 28.3 12.6 9.4 2.4 6.3
Junior High 17.0 26.7 23.3 12.1 4.2 1.8 14.8
Vocational 16.0 32.5 27.8 11.7 4.0 1.9 5.4
College/
University 21.0 27.2 24.0 12.2 3.9 2.2 9.4
N 5 (310) (469) (418) (195) (77) (34) (175)
v 2 5 69.0, p , 0.01
Source: World Values Study Group, World Values Survey 1990 (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social
Research).
aftermath, the Vajpayee government continued to enjoy a fair amount of freedom
in its efforts to govern.
The nationalist-religiou s RP was forced to compromise on its more extreme
political postures, such as taking Turkey out of the European Customs Union and
forming an ‘Islamic Customs Union’ with other countries from Pakistan to the
Middle East. Similarly, after acquiring power, the BJP was forced to moderate
































NATIONALIST-RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY
was evident with regard to the efforts of the BJP government to distance itself
from its ideological allies, the Shiv Sena (SS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), following the November 1998 assembly elections in three states. In the
process, the party tended to alienate its existing basis of support.
In the  nal analysis, with regard to the threat posed by these parties to the
secular state, what matters is their action rather than their rhetoric. Therefore, our
argument does not imply support in any way to nationalist-religiou s parties.
Quite the contrary, our argument is that once exposed to the political dynamics
of rule, these parties will be subject to the contradictory pulls of holding on to
their core supporters on the one hand, and making the compromises necessary
to keep the coalition together and provide effective governance on the other. In
other words, they must both moderate their agendas and perform successfully to
maintain support. Under such circumstances it would be dif cult to maintain
their posture as a ‘party with a difference’.
The rise of the RP and the BJP
The RP and the BJP emerged, in part, as reactions to the perceived threats posed
by the West to the traditional values and culture which form the basis of their
respective societies. In Turkey, Islamic resurgence, repressed under Mustafa
Kemal and Ismet Inonu from 1923 to the 1950s, started to gain strength under
the Democrat Party (DP) government of Adnan Menderes. The  rst pro-Islamic
Party to be organized in modern Turkey, the National Order Party (NOP) was
founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969, later becoming the National Salvation
Party (NSP), which participated in three governments in the 1970s.9 By the
1970s, party cadres began to demonstrate hostility towards the ideas of Ataturk,
enshrined in the state ideology of ‘Kemalism’. As a result, the military regime
closed down the party on the grounds that it was undermining the secular
character of the state. In 1983, the party resurfaced as the Refah Party, under the
prime ministership of the popular Turgut Ozal of the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP), who prided himself on being a devout Muslim. In the elections of 1984,
the RP lost some support to Ozal, ending up with only 4% of the vote. Since the
1990s, however, the RP has recovered lost ground and continues to gain support,
especially in the countryside, as well as among urban migrants who have swelled
the shanty towns of major cities. Ignored by other parties, the RP has come to
their rescue. Today, the party (reorganised as the Fazilet or Virtue Party), like
the BJP in India, is modern in its techniques, better organized than the other
parties, and focuses its social, political and economic activities at the grassroots
level to mobilize its supporters. Its appeal is based on its opposition to big
capitalism and communism, the strengthening of national and moral values,
emphasis on heavy industry, independence from the West, and stronger ties with
the Islamic world.10
A number of factors have contributed to the rise of the RP. Among them were
Ozal’s support for greater religious freedom, the enormous growth in Islamic
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Turkish military. Ironically, while demanding the closure of the religious schools
today, it was the military which mandated religious education as a compulsory
component of education in primary and secondary schools and gymnasiums,
even making this requirement a part of the Constitution .12
Tracing its political ancestry to the Hindu Mahasabha (Great Assembly),
formed at the turn of the century, the BJP, in terms of its ideology, organization
and leadership structure, is the direct descendant of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh
(BJS).13 Following the electoral reverses of the BJS as part of the Janata Party
(JP) in 1980, it broke away from the JP and renamed itself the Bharatiya Janata
Party in order to emphasize its continued links to the Janata Party’s populist
orientation. In its effort to broaden its appeal, the new party under the leadership
of its founding president, Atal Behari Vajpayee, made a conscious effort to
divest itself of the chauvinistic Hindu nationalism of the Jan Sangh. Like the RP
the party committed itself to nationalism, national integration, democracy, posi-
tive secularism and value-based politics.14 The leaders of the new party, like their
Turkish counterpart rejected both capitalism and Marxism, arguing that while the
former created inequality in society, the latter denied individual freedom.15
The 1995 elections in Turkey and the 1996 elections in India
The socio-economic environment and the national mood in Turkey and India
immediately preceding the 1995 and 1996 elections, respectively, de ned the
cutting-edge issues underlying the campaigns. Economic concerns, like rising
prices, remained paramount in both countries, especially in Turkey, given its
runaway in ation. Cynicism remained pervasive among the general population
as re ected by their attitude toward political leaders and the governmental
process in general. A survey of citizen attitudes in the two countries in the early
1990s revealed that a majority of people, around 55% in India and 78% in
Turkey, felt that the country was run for the ‘bene t of a few big interests’,
while about 42% in India and 31% in Turkey believed they could trust their
government to do right ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’.16 As in India, corruption
was also a major issue in the Turkish elections. In India, a series of  nancial
scandals, starting with the Hawala scandal involving former Prime Minister P.
V. Narasimha Rao resulted in widespread opposition charges of corruption
against him and his government.17 In like manner, Prime Minister Ciller in
Turkey was confronted with accusations of corruption related to her personal
wealth and her use of a ‘slush’ fund. Not surprisingly , corruption ranked high
among the concern of citizens in both countries just prior to the elections.18
When the results of the Turkish elections became clear (see Table 3), the
formation of a secular government which excluded the Islamists appeared
problematical. At the national level the RP, with 22.1%, received the largest
share of the vote, followed by 20.3% for the Motherland Party (ANAP), 19.8%
for the True Path Party (DYP), 15.2% for the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and
11.2% for the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The ultra-nationalis t National
































NATIONALIST-RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY
Table 3. Results of the 1995 Elections in Turkey and the 1996 Elections in India
Turkey India
Parties Votes Seats Parties Votes Seats
RP 22.1 157 BJP 20.3 161
ANAP 20.3 132 INC 28.8 140
DYP 19.8 136 JD 8.1 47
DSP 15.2 75 CPI (M) 6.1 32
CHP 11.2 50 CPI 2.0 12
MHP 8.2 — INC (Tiwari) 1.5 4
Others 4.2 — Others 33.1 147
Total 100.0 550 Total 99.9 543
Source: J. C. Aggarwal and N. K. Choudhary, Elections in India 1998 with comparative
data since 1952 (New Delhi: Sipra, 1998); and Hurriyet, 25 December 1995, p 19.
representation in the national assembly. In terms of parliamentary seats, the RP
bagged the largest number with 158 of the 550 seats. The DYP, with 135 seats,
came in second, followed by the ANAP with 133, the DSP with 75 and 40 for
the CHP.19 However, no party succeeded in gaining the 276 seats needed to rule.
In this situation, a logical solution would have been for the center-right DYP and
the center-left ANAP to form a coalition, both being secular parties. But the
leaders of the two parties, Ciller and Yilmaz, respectively, seemed determined to
keep the other out of power while at the same time refusing to enter into an
alliance with Refah. In addition, the DSP declared it would support a Center-
Right coalition, but only from the outside.
In India, the Hindu BJP, like the Islamist RP in Turkey, emerged as the
biggest gainer with the Congress as the worst loser (see Table 3). Going into
the elections, the BJP held 128 seats and 20% of the vote compared to the
Congress(I)’s 274 seats and 36.5%. When the May 1966 election results were
announced, the BJP emerged as the winner with 163 seats and 25.5% of the vote
while the Congress secured 136 seats and 28.1% of the vote.20 Hence, even
though the BJP received less votes than the Congress (I), it polled a larger share
of the seats because of its more concentrated bases of support. India was faced
with a dif cult situation; as no party enjoyed a majority the result was a hung
Parliament.
Post-election coalition politics in Turkey and India
The political maneuverings that followed the elections in the two countries were
almost mirror re ections of each other. An exclusionist strategy formed the
centerpiece of the secular parties and the axiom of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my
friend’ formed the basic rationale behind alliance politics. The December 1995
Turkish national election, like the May 1996 one in India, was contested by a
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right DYP and ANAP were the major contenders, having held power since the
military relinquished it in 1982. The major challengers were two center-left
parties, the DSP and the CHP. Increasingly, these centrist parties had been
challenged by the Islamist RP. Also contesting the elections were the ultra-
nationalist National Action Party (MHP) of former military leader Alparslan
Turkes and the Grand Unity Party (BBP) which entered into electoral alliance
with the ANAP. In India, the main contenders were the centrist Congress Party,
the right-wing BJP, the left-wing Communist parties (primarily the CPI and
CPM), the left-of-center Janata Party and other smaller regional parties.
The Welfarepath/Erbakan–Ciller coalition was driven both by Ciller’s desire
to avoid further parliamentary inquiry into her previous affairs and her blind
political ambition. RP leader Erbakan announced the landmark coalition govern-
ment with the DYP in late June 1996. Even though Erbakan took care to
moderate the RP’s radical image,21 the RP ran into trouble with the military and
the secular elites over the issue of the closure of the imam hatip religious schools
which were regarded as vehicles for undermining the secular state. The RP
refused to budge on the issue. The Constitutiona l Court, under pressure from the
military, declared the RP illegal and banned its leader Erbakan from politics for
 ve years.22 As a result, the party changed its name to the Fazilet (Virtue) Party,
sought to refurbish its image as distinct from Refah, and continues to operate
within the political system. The exposure of the RP to power and its misuse of
the same to further its religious agenda resulted in the party ending up third in
the April 1999 local and national elections in Turkey. It was beaten at the polls
by both the DSP and the NAP. In addition, the nationalist upsurge created by the
capture of Kurdish Worker’s Party leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in February
1999 helped to boost support for the DSP and the NAP and take votes away
from the Virtue Party.
Following the 1996 election, politics in India resembled in many ways
developments in Turkey. The Congress(I) Party was humiliated at the polls, and
Prime Minister Rao was forced to submit his resignation. With a hung Parlia-
ment, regional bosses assumed great importance and descended on Delhi to
jockey for power. The BJP and its allies, as the largest grouping, formally staked
its claim to put together a parliamentary majority. Its leader, Vajpayee, was
invited by President Shankar Dayal Sharma to make the  rst attempt to form a
government. This proved to be a Herculean task since the other parties banded
together in an effort to defeat the BJP through a vote of no-con dence, while
engaging in frantic bargaining to form an alternative government capable of
commanding a majority.
The problems facing the BJP became immediately apparent on 16 May 1996.
Ten Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) deputies, representing India’s lowest castes and
expected to back the BJP, had second thoughts about joining a coalition led by
the predominantly upper-caste, Hindu-nationalis t BJP, leaving the party only
with the support of two small parties; the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Harayana
Vikas Party. Realizing that it would be virtually impossible for him to create a
































NATIONALIST-RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY
Vajpayee submitted his resignation to the president after the shortest tenure as
prime minister in India’s history. His resignation cleared the way for the
National Front/Left Front (NF/LF) coalition to form a United Front government
under the leadership of H.D. Deve Gowda. The new coalition, with the support
of the Congress(I) and the left parties from the outside, was able to win a vote
of con dence and form a government. However, like the last experiment with a
coalition government, this new one also proved short-lived. The withdrawal of
support by Congress on 11 April 1997 led to the downfall of the 10 month-old
Gowda coalition government. It was followed by another United Front govern-
ment led by I.K. Gujral, with the help of the Congress(I) from the outside.
However, this government followed in the footsteps of its predecessor, succumb-
ing to its own internal contradictions.23 The elections that followed in 1998
witnessed the formation of the second Nationalist-Hindu dominated coalition
government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. Along with its
allies, it emerged as the largest political grouping in the country and further
enhanced its electoral standing.
To a signi cant degree, the electoral successes of the BJP and the RP were
partly a function of their ability to project themselves as more cohesive, better
organized, less corrupt and better able to deal with the economic problems facing
their respective countries than their rivals. Both parties were led by nationally
popular leaders; Vaypayee in India and Erbakan in Turkey. Their success was
also facilitated by the inability of secular parties to provide an effective and
‘clean’ government at the center.
Inclusion or exclusion?
The continuation of the RP in its new reincarnation as the Virtue Party (Erbakan,
despite being banned from politics, continues to exercise ultimate power)
suggests that it is very dif cult to prevent nationalist-religiou s parties from
operating within a democratic framework through a policy of exclusion. First, by
declaring the RP illegal and banning its leader Erbakan for  ve years, from
politics, the Constitutiona l Court, presumably under pressure from the military,
may have succeeded in conveying the false impression that the problem
associated with a religious party has been resolved. In fact, it might have
succeeded only in compounding it. For instance, it might have helped to create
a ‘martyred’ image for the now defunct RP which the newly formed Virtue Party
(VP) could exploit in the next election if the present government led by prime
minister Bulent Ecivit fails to deliver. Even more problematic is the prospect that
religious radicals within the RP might be driven underground.
Second, from the perspective of the ballot box, an exclusionist strategy has
clearly proved to be counterproductive . Both parties made spectacular electoral
gains in the 1990s and the BJP in India continues to go from strength to strength.
After the September/October 1999 elections, it has now become a national party.
Hence, the BJP has been able to thrive at the expense of the secular parties,
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Congress(I) to withdraw its support from the Gowda government lend credence
to Vajpayee’s pre-election claim that the ‘stability issue’ was no longer a
Congress(I) monopoly.24 In the process Congress(I) has been the biggest loser
with its representation in parliament having dropped to an all-time low. Having
failed to provide a viable alternative after keeping the BJP out of power, the
secular parties led by the Congress(I) provided the BJP with a powerful
argument to win favor with the electorate in the 1999 elections, when it emerged
as the largest party. The Kargil War and India’s victory under Vajpayee’s
leadership provided an additional bonus.
Third, in a democratic polity, what makes a policy of exclusion less defensible
is the fact that these parties came to power through democratic means and in the
process emerged as the largest parties in the country. Under these circumstances,
preventing them from exercising power ignores the wishes of a large segment of
the electorate of these countries. For instance, as public opinion polls in India
suggest, a signi cant segment of the electorate that includes ‘scuppies’ (saffron-
clad yuppies) does not obviously share the fears of the elites and intelligentisi a
with regard to the threat posed by a nationalist-Hindu government in India.25 In
addition, a majority of the people preferred a BJP led government with Vajpayee
as its leader. Illustratively , the results of a Times of India poll conducted on 14
August 1999 shows that 44% of the public favored a BJP government and 57%
considered Vajpayee to be the best leader.26 Given the political maturity of the
Indian electorate, which it has demonstrated quite frequently, it would be more
advisable to rely on astute voters to politically bury the BJP if it threatens India’s
secular polity.
Finally, a policy of isolating or marginalizing moderate nationalist-religiou s
parties only helps play into the hands of the religious extremists and transform
their political moderation into political extremism, especially in the absence of
any institutiona l avenues for getting their preferences represented. The situation
in Algeria and Egypt comes to mind where efforts to exclude the Islamic parties
by force has resulted in the politics of violence and terrorism. In Algeria the
military-backed government of President Liamine Zeroual canceled the 1992
elections which the Islamic Salvation Front was expected to win. The result was
widespread violence which has so far claimed the lives of over 75,00 Algerians.
In Egypt, the banned Muslim Brotherhood poses similar problems for the
Egyptian government with terrorists attacks posing a real problem.
In contrast, an inclusionist policy offers a number of advantages in dealing
with nationalist-religiou s parties. In this connection the Turkish and Indian
experience with the RP and BJP is instructive. The inability of the RP-led
coalition to survive for more than 10 months, even after dramatically altering its
religious face, is suggestive of some of the pitfalls confronting nationalist -
religious parties in their quest to undermine the secular state. The initial policy
of inclusion adopted by the Turkish state helped to expose the RP to the risks
faced by a non-secular party governing a secular state, which were to prove
instrumental in its downfall. As in the case of the BJP in India, the RP did not
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women and secular elites, crossed paths with big business houses in its hostile
policy toward Europe, bungled foreign policy initiatives in Libya and other
Islamic countries, continued security co-operation with the USA, and repeatedly
appeared to be climbing down from its promises to be ‘different’. Its staf ng of
key bureaucracies with large numbers of Islamists caused widespread concern
even before the military took action. All of this helped to undermine its
credibility and public standing. Similarly, the BJP has been seen back-tracking
on its position on key issues like the building of the temple at the Babri Mosque
site, introducing a uniform civil code, and repealing Article 370 of the consti-
tution (pertaining to Kashmir’s special status).
The policy of inclusion meant that nationalist-religion s parties were no longer
able to to sit in the opposition and criticize the government for political pro t.
They were now in the ‘hot seat’ themselves and subjected to the same king of
oppositiona l scrutiny and criticism. Having had a chance to run the country
and having turned in a poor performance, it was more dif cult to project
themselves as somehow better able to govern the country compared to
secular parties. The less than satisfactory performance on the political and
economic fronts by the RP and the BJP are cases in point. The RP which came
to power on tall promises of improving the lives of the ordinary Turks, failed to
give any indication that it was capable of doing so. It became enmeshed in a
major controversy regarding implementing education reform, and involved the
closure of religious schools demanded by the military. The party’s efforts to
remove women employees from of ce, and pack pivotal bureaucracies with
religious school graduates also contributed to its demise.27 In India, Vajpayee’s
coalition government, like its predecessor has been staggering from one crisis to
another with its partners pulling in different directions. For this reason, accord-
ing to many members of the Sangh Parivar and BJP, the previous BJP-led
government was not able to measure up to their expectations.28 Such comments
from its own ranks cannot help but undermine the faith of its supporters. On the
political front, its Pokhran ploy (testing  re nuclear devices in May 1998), seems
to have left the BJP without any concrete political gains at the electoral
hustings. 29
In the absence of effective rule by the secular parties, a policy of exclusion
also helps parties like the RP and BJP to attract disgruntled voters and create
sympathy. Partly for this reason, both the parties were able to attract a large
protest vote from people who perceived the secular parties as being deeply mired
in corruption or incapable of providing effective government. Having never been
in power meant they were able to get the bene t of the doubt from the electorate.
From this perspective, the signi cant increase in support for the RP in the 1995
elections has to be regarded as a vote against the secular parties, rather than a
vote for the RP. Similarly, the gains made by the BJP in the 1998 and 1999
elections re ect a protest vote against the perceived inept, corrupt secular parties
and a vote for Vajpayee, rather than a vote for the BJP’s ideology of Hinduvta.
In short, while a policy of exclusion and isolation was meant to combat the
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by helping them to expand their support within the electorate and ultimately
come to power.
In addition, there seems to be some discrepancy, both in India and Turkey,
between elite and popular attitudes toward these nationalist-religiou s parties (see
Table 4). Most of the supporters of the BJP seem to relate more closely to the
nationalisti c stance of these parties, even though they may not care for their
religious rhetoric. Partly because of this reason, the religious pro le of BJP
supporters is not very different from the rest of the population. For instance, on
a number of indicators of religious orientation, BJP supporters are quite
comparable to the general population. Contrary to popular elite perceptions in
India, a smaller proportion of BJP supporters consider themselves to be religious
than the general population, and pray about as often as the rest. More impor-
tantly, in terms of religious identity, prospective BJP voters were less likely than
the rest of the population to identify themselves as ‘above all a Hindu’, and more
inclined to think of themselves as ‘Indians  rst and members of a religious group
second’. Even more surprising is the  nding that BJP partisans were less likely
than their Congress counterparts to declare themselves as being ‘religious’, nor
did they consider religion to be any more important than the Congress(I)
supporters. In short, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that a majority
of BJP supporters are ‘Hindu fanatics’ or even religious.30 They do not appear
to from a base from which the BJP can draw the requisite strength to dismantle
the secular state. Although, in the case of Refah supporters there are some
differences on three of the  ve indicators for Turkey, these differences are
considerable only with regard to the extent to which they attend religious
services. Consequently , increasing support for moderate religious parties should
not be interpreted as representing identi cation with the religious goals of these
parties, but probably their nationalisti c message.
Like the RP the BJP faces an array of parties united only by their common
determination of keeping India a secular state. Given the inability of the two
nationalist-religiou s parties to obtain a majority in the 1995 and 1999 elections
in Turkey, and the 1996 and 1998 elections in India, they were forced to enter
into opportunistic , electoral understandings with other parties. As a result, they
had to compromise on their extremist platforms and alienate their more extreme
supporters. For example, in their desire to taste power, the leaders of the two
parties were more than willing to make major concessions to moderate their
respective parties’ political programs. In Turkey, Erbakan had to back down
from his vow to ‘change the system’, take Turkey out of the European Customs
Union and transform it into an Islamic state. He was forced to accept the secular
basis of the Turkish state.31
Similarly, the BJP has been forced to make compromises in order to win allies
and gain power at the risk of alienating its more extreme supporters. It is evident
from the repeated statements of BJP leaders like Vajpayee and L.K. Advani that
the party has put on the back-burner the three corner stones of its 50 year-old
ideology: building a temple at the Babri Mosque site, introducing a uniform civil
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Table 4. Religiosity in India and Turkey (%)
India BJP Turkey RP
Importance of religiona (1.8) (1.5) (1.6) (1.2)
Very 49.3 59.2 61.2 79.1
Quite 32.1 33.9 23.0 18.3
Not very 12.0 4.4 10.6 2.3
Not at all 6.6 2.5 5.2 0.3
N 5 2495 460 1018 43
Is religious:b
Yes 83.7 84.4 74.6 88.1
No 15.7 14.7 24.3 11.9
Atheist 0.6 0.9 1.2 —
N 5 2441 462 1002 —
Sense of religious identity:c
Above all a Hindu 42.9 29.2 — —
Above all a Muslim 5.5 (4) — —
Above all member of another 3.3 (5) — —
religious denomination
Indian  rst and member of 48.3 68.9 — —
religious group second
N 5 2511 469 — —
Attend religious services:d (2.4) (2.5) (3.5) (2.4)
More than once a week 30.9 30.1 14.0 41.9
Once a week 28.3 23.7 20.7 18.6
Once a month 16.6 43.5 3.4 4.7
On religious festivals 12.1 2.8 31.0 31.0
and Holidays
N 5 2511 469 1017 43
How often pray:e (1.7) (1.9) — —
Often 42.1 40.3 — —
At times 46.1 46.1 — —
Rarely 7.3 8.3 — —
At times of crisis 4.6 5.3 — —
N 5 2511 469 — —
Source: World Values Study Group, World Values Survey 1990 (Ann Arbor: Institute for
Social Research).
aPlease say, for each of the following (religion), how important it is to your life?
bIndependently of whether you go to the temple/church/mosque or not, would you say you
are a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist. cTo which of the following
groups do you belong above all? dApart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how
often do attend religious services these days? eHow often do you pray to God outside of
religious services?
state of Jammu and Kashmir. More recently, Vajpayee struck a conciliatory note
with regard to relations with Pakistan and even rode the bus to Lahore to
improve India–Pakistan relations, much to the displeasure of party hardliners. To
them, it seemed like a compromise of the BJP’s long-standing antipathy to
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often contradictory statements issued by the party leadership and the govern-
mental leaders to keep both their supporters and opponents at bay helps to
expose the unprincipled positions of BJP leaders. This point is illustrated by the
tendency of BJP leader Pramod Mahajan, and sometimes Advani, to contradict
Vajpayee until recently on issues related to foreign policy, Kashmir and,
especially, the Babri Masjid issue. The fact that, despite these contradictions , the
BJP-led alliance went on to win the 1999 elections is due to two factors. First,
its policy of opportunisti c alliances with regional parties helped to enhance it
performance at the polls by extending its geographical reach. Second, and maybe
more importantly, Vajpayee’s own personal popularity had a lot to do with the
victory. If one can go by the series of opinion polls conducted by different
organizations and newspapers, support for Vajpayee far exceeded that for the
BJP. This fact has helped to establish Vajpayee’s predominant position within
the party and vis-à-vis his allies.33
Conclusion
The Turkish experience suggests that an exclusionist policy of combating the
perceived threat of nationalist-religiou s parties by forcing their closure or
forcibly excluding them from power is anti-democratic and does not work. For,
as the case of Turkey suggests, in democracies they tend to re-emerge under a
different guise. In the Turkish case, even though the party was essentially
operating according to the democratic rules of the game, and enjoyed widespread
popular support, it was banned on the grounds that it violated the Kemalist
dictum that a party must follow secular principles.
We have argued that a more appropriate strategy for dealing with nationalist -
religious parties may be to include them in, rather than exclude them from the
political system, as long as they are prepared to operate within the democratic
framework.34 A policy of inclusion as part of a coalition exposes nationalist -
religious parties to the political dynamics of a coalition government. As the
leader of a coalition, they have to provide effective governance. That is easier
said than done. At the same time, the party is deprived of the luxury of being
able to sit on the sidelines and criticize an incumbent secular government. There
is also the danger that efforts to bar these parties from gaining political power
by force, as is the case in Algeria and Egypt, may lead to their greater
radicalization and a shift towards violence and terrorism in order to attain their
objectives. It also helps to negate the ‘fairness’ argument, so successfully
exploited by the BJP after its  rst stint in government for 13 days.
The earlier spectacle of the 1998 coalition members of the BJP government
like the All India Anna Diravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and Trina-
mool Congress (TMC) pulling the party in different directions might be indica-
tive of what can be expected a year or two later in today’s expanded coalition
of over 20 parties. This political tug-of-war has confronted the BJP with
the dilemna of trying to satisfy the demands of its coalition partners as well as its
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religious parties to operate as part of a coalition government consisting of
secular parties could help to contain any radical religious tendencies of the party.
The experiences of the RP in Turkey and the BJP in India suggest that efforts
at coalition formation with secular parties forced them to compromise on their
political and religious agenda. The re-making of the public image of the BJP in
recent years is probably the most compelling testimony in support of a policy of
inclusion. The resulting disillusionmen t among their hardcore supporters has
resulted in intra-party con icts between the moderates and the radicals. As
Erbakan and Vajpayee learned the hard way, it is a dangerous proposition trying
to ride the tiger of religious sectarianism and bigotry in order to gain and
maintain power. Vajpayee’s public declaration in 1998 that he would not again
run for public of ce might have something to do with this realisation. The public
criticism of the BJP’s leadership as part of the earlier coalition, its willingness
to compromise on its swadeshi plank, and its efforts to moderate its religious
ideology could well form the basis of serious schisms within the party. Given the
heavy dependence of the party on Prime Minister Vajpayee for its current
popularity, his departure might result in the BJP being reduced to the position
of a minor party should it try to reassert its Hinduvta ideology.
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